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Loyalty and competence in public agencies
Abstract
Competent public agencies are associated with better economic outcomes. Beyond competence, political
leaders need to secure the loyalty of their agencies. Unfortunately, several theories predict a tradeoff
between these two valued features. This paper finds that recruitment into agencies is meritocratic where
(1) agency officials have poor outside options, (2) careers in agencies are long-lasting, and (3) agency
loyalty is important. Moreover, agency competence is lower when (4) loyalty is important but the time
horizon is short, and (5) outside opportunities improve but the time horizon is long. This evidence fits
best with a theory of loyalty as non-contractible behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
Loyalty of public agencies to the government (and in particular the prime minister or other head 
of the government) is valued highly.  Anecdotal evidence for the US from Wilson (1989: 198) 
VXJJHVWVWKDWDJHQF\H[HFXWLYHVDQGWKHLUVWDII³DUHVHOHFWHGLQRUGHUWRVHUYHWKHSROLWLFDOQHHGV
of the president, and these may or may not involve policy considerations."  Governments are also 
interested in other types of loyalty, e.g., the absence of bribery and corruption.   
Unfortunately, anecdotal observation also suggests that agency loyalty does not always 
come without costs.  For example, the governmental appointment process is frequently regarded 
as being strongly dominated by considerations of loyalty, at the cost of competence (Edwards 
2001).  Some argue that this leads to "amateur government" (Cohen 1998).  Indeed, Heclo (1977: 
99) observed that "many of [the agency's executive's] selectors [are] more interested in the 
process of getting their way than in the executive's eventual output."  If competence of agencies 
is lower, economic growth and performance will suffer.  This appears to be a problem of interest 
not only in developing countries.  For example, some observers worried about the value US 
President George W. Bush and his administration appeared to put on loyalty.  Obviously, this 
academic paper does not take a partisan point of view.  But consider this excerpt from an 
interview (on NovemEHUZLWK.DWULQD9DQGHQ+HXYHORQ³3DXOD=DKQ1RZ´DSULPH
WLPHVKRZRQ&11´1  
Zahn³/HW¶VPRYHRQWRDQRWKHUFRQWURYHUV\EUHZLQJLQWKH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ7KHUH
are a lot of critics out there suggesting that, in moving the kind of people the Bush 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ LV LQWRWKH&DELQHWSRVLWLRQV \RX¶UHGRLQJ LWQRWEHFDXVHRIFRPSHWHQF\
but out of loyalty, leading to what they say will be a dangerous group think mentality. Do 
\RXVHHLWWKDWZD\"´ 
Vanden Heuvel ³<HV3DXOD LI FRPSHWHQFHZDV DQ LVVXHKHUH\RXZRXOGQ¶W VHHDQ\RI
WKHVHSHRSOHLQWKLVDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ´ 
:KHWKHU RU QRW RQH DJUHHV ZLWK 9DQGHQ +HXYHO¶V UHVSRQVH ERWK =DKQ DQG 9DQGHQ +HXYHO
appear to believe in the premise ± that there is a tradeoff between loyalty and competence.  This 
paper studies whether the concern voiced in this exchange is mirrored systematically in evidence 
on competence in public agencies in a cross-section of countries.   
Although the primary focus of the paper is empirical, it is useful to guide the statist ical 
analysis with theory.  Recent theoretical research in organizational economics and political 
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economy has unearthed reasons why a tradeoff between loyalty and competence may arise as the 
optimal solution to an agency problem (Egorov and Sonin 2006; Glazer 2002; Wagner 2006).  To 
test the hypotheses that flow from these and other models, this paper employs a dataset on 
important state economic agencies (ministries and central banks) in semi-industrialized and 
developing countries, compiled by Evans and Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Evans (2000).  The 
empirical analysis reveals that governments choose to have highly competent officials in their 
agencies (as measured by the prevalence of civil service exams for top officials) (1) where 
officials have few private sector contacts and are less likely to retire to jobs in the private sector, 
(2) where careers in agencies are expected to be long-lasting, and (3) where the agencies are 
powerful, i.e., where their loyalty is important.  Moreover, competence is lower (4) when loyalty 
is important but simultaneously the time horizon is short, and (5) when outside opportunities 
improve but simultaneously the time horizon is long.  Although not all estimates are statistically 
significant in all regressions, overall these findings are consistent with a model of loyalty as a 
non-contractible behavior along the lines of Wagner (2006), while they are harder to reconcile 
with or are in contrast to predictions of other theories.  As such, to my knowledge, this paper 
offers the first test of conflicting theories of loyalty and competence.2  Additionally, the empirics 
suggest that a greater extent of political appointment is associated with less meritocratic 
recruitment.  These results are obtained controlling for country variables such how long civil 
service exams have been in place, human capital (educational attainment), development level 
(GDP p.c.), and other factors.   
The question of what factors are associated with greater competence in the public sector is 
important for the understanding of cross-country differences in economic performance.  For 
example, Rauch and Evans (2000) find that meritocratic recruitment is a statistically significant 
determinant of ratings by country risk agencies.  Evans (1995) argues, following Max Weber, that 
replacement of a patronage system for state officials by a professional state bureaucracy is a 
necessary (though not sufficient) condition for a state to grow economically.  Evans and Rauch 
 LQGHHG ILQG WKDW PRUH ³:HEHULDQ´ DJHQFLHV LQFOXding those that have meritocractic 
recruitment) allow countries to achieve greater economic growth.  This paper, thus, takes it as 
given that greater competence in agencies increases output, and it aims to determine which 
institutional factors go hand in hand with higher competence in public agencies.  That is, it 
considers the choice of the recruitment mechanism as endogenous.  By recognizing that 
competence can, under some conditions, have a cost, namely, endogenously lower loyalty, the 
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paper also adds to WKHOLWHUDWXUHRQ³QHZSXEOLFPDQDJHPHQW´ZKLFKKDVVRIDUPRVWO\IRFXVHG
on explicit mechanisms like performance-based pay and tournaments as tools for eliciting better 
performance from agents (Aucoin 1990; Caiden 1988).3   
The present paper considers the interaction between a central government and its agencies.  
As such, it is closely related to the important bureaucracy literature in public choice that studies 
agencies and a sponsor such as a government or a legislature.4  A vast literature exists on this 
subject, and it is impossible to review it comprehensively here. (For a textbook treatment, see 
Mueller 2003; for surveys, see Wintrobe 1997, Niskanen 2001 and Chang et al. 2001.)  One view 
asserts that the expertise of agencies is superior to the legislature, thus leading to inefficient 
allocations when the bureaucrat wishes to maximize the budget (Niskanen 1971).  5  Others have 
considered a slack-maximizing bureaucracy (Wyckoff 1990).  Dunleavy (1985; 1991) instead 
GHYHORSVWKH³EXUHDX-VKDSLQJ´LGHa according to which bureaucrats want to shape their agency so 
as to maximize their personal utilities from their work (and not necessarily the budget).  All these 
motivations of agency officials are important reasons why and how the government offers 
rewards for agency loyalty.   
Section 2 begins by reviewing the theoretical background and key predictions.  Section 3 
describes the data.  Section 4 presents the empirical results.  Section 5 concludes.  
2. Hypothesis development 
7KH SDSHU¶V FRQWULEXWLRQ LV SULParily empirical.  Nonetheless, it is helpful to structure the 
discussion along some recent theories, in order to be able to derive some specific hypotheses.   
2.1 Basic framework 
Consider a central government that charges an agency with delivering some output.6  For the 
SXUSRVHVRI WKHSUHVHQWSDSHUDQGWKHHPSLULFDOSUHGLFWLRQVZHZLOO IRFXVRQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
problem of choosing whom to recruit into the high positions in public agencies.7  Let us assume 
that the government is a unitary actor that can choose the hiring rules for its agencies and that it 
has some incentive to have agencies provide high-quality service.8  For example, agencies with 
more meritocratic recruitment to the top provide better public goods and allow the economy to 
grow faster.  One way to secure competence in agencies is to require formal exams to enter civil 
service or at least before entering a high-level position.   
Not all of the needs of the government or of the agency executives themselves are covered 
by having highly able agency officials.  Beyond competence, the government is also interested in 
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PDNLQJ VXUH WKDW DJHQF\ H[HFXWLYHV DQG HPSOR\HHV DFW OR\DOO\ WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V QHHGV
Loyalty in this context is taken to mean two things in particular: first, not pushing for policies 
WKDW DUH DJDLQVW WKH FHQWUDO JRYHUQPHQW¶V SODQV DQG VHFRQG QRW HQJDJLQJ LQ LOOHJDO VLGH
activities. 9   But both types of loyal actions ± voluntarily chosen alignment in policy and 
minimization of illegal activity ± bring (opportunity) costs with them for officials, whether or not 
the actions are socially efficient.  Thus, the government will have to promise rewards, such as 
support in hard times for the agency, larger budgets, the opportunity to shape the bureau as 
desired, or an opportunity for agency officers to rise through the government ranks.10  This 
interaction takes place over time.11   
2.2 Models of loyalty and competence 
This basic framework can be used to understand the different predictions of various models 
which I now adapt to the context of public agencies.  Unfortunately, because of the very different 
natures of the existing models (which comprise static and dynamic, complete, incomplete, and 
asymmetric information sets, and so on), no unified theoretical treatment seems feasible.  Instead, 
I proceed with a verbal discussion of each model and refer to the underlying papers for details.   
/HWXVEHJLQE\FRQVLGHULQJ:DJQHU¶VPRGHO7KHNH\DVVXPSWLRQWKHUHLVWKDWERWK
loyalty and rewards are non-contractible and that their exchange thus needs to be sustained 
through repeated interaction.  In trying to induce officials to exhibit loyalty by rewarding them 
properly, the government faces the problem that more competent agency officials have better side 
opportunities (some of which are exactly the sort of illegal activity the government wants to 
prevent).  In particular, it is likely that more competent agency officials are better able to find 
opportunities for accepting bribes.  They are more effective at search for side opportunities, they 
may be able to detect loopholes in the legal system, and they receive more offers because their 
services are of greater value to those who pay the bribe.  Moreover, for a given strength of the 
contacts between the private and public sectors, more competent officials also have better outside 
options in the private sector if they are fired or retire.  Both observations imply that more 
competent officials have a more attractive reneging path and are, therefore, less easily induced to 
foregoing their preferred choice of independent (disloyal) action, be it their own preferred policy 
or illegal side activities.  This makes it difficult to sustain loyalty with highly competent officials.  
6HYHUDO SUHGLFWLRQV IRU WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V FKRLFH RI WKH OHYHO RI FRPSHWHQFH RI Dgency officials 
follow from this model:   
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A. Competence is lower where there are better side opportunities (illegal activities or private 
sector options).  
The reason is that when more side opportunities are available, competence is even more 
productive outside, making loyalty harder to obtain with high competence, thus leading to a 
decrease in optimal competence for a desired level of loyalty.   
B. Competence is higher where public sector careers are expected to last longer. 
Competence will be higher if individuals are more patient, because a self-enforcing contract 
such as loyalty becomes more easily sustainable over time.   
C. Competence increases as the value of loyalty increases.   
7KLVODVWSUHGLFWLRQLVDWILUVWVXUSULVLQJ,WDULVHVLQ:DJQHU¶VPRGel because the greater the 
value of loyalty to the principal, the more credibly he can promise rewards.  If, by contrast, 
loyalty generates only a small surplus, the government can only promise rewards that suffice to 
induce less competent staff and executives to behave loyally.  
The theoretical model also has predictions for interaction terms.   
D. The interaction between side opportunities and length of expected interaction reduces 
competence. 
E. The interaction between the value of loyalty and length of expected interaction increases 
competence. 
The logic behind these two predictions is the following.  When the duration of interaction is 
longer, competence is, ceteris paribus, higher (prediction B).  According to prediction A, as side 
opportunities become greater, the deviation temptation becomes greater, decreasing optimal 
competence.  Thus, with a long duration of interaction, the detrimental effect of an increase in 
side opportunities is larger than if competence is already relatively small (which is the case when 
the duration of interaction is short).  The opposite holds for the value of loyalty.  
Another directly relevant and intuitively appealing model of loyalty and competence is 
Egorov and Sonin (2006).  In their model, more competent viziers are more prone to treason.  
The reason is that they are better able to discriminate among potential plotters, making them 
more risky subordinates for the ruler because the ruler has to fear that the better informed advisor 
misinforms him.  Therefore, dictators may prefer incompetent viziers.  Incentive schemes by the 
dictator find limitations in the likelihood that the government itself remains in place.  The authors 
finetune their model to the context of dictatorships, but they also discuss its assumptions and 
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implications relative to the other papers mentioned here.  Indeed, the basic insights apply to the 
relationship between a central government and an agency; or even more generally to any 
organization where the center has agents that may try to usurp the central power through 
misinformation.  Egorov and Sonin predict that where loyalty is more important (in the 
terminology of their paper, where the stakes are high for the dictator), the agent should be less 
FRPSHWHQW  $V GLVFXVVHG DERYH :DJQHU¶V PRGHO LQVWHDd suggests that more valuable loyalty 
makes loyalty more easily implementable even with competent agencies, leading to a positive 
FRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHYDOXHRIOR\DOW\DQGFRPSHWHQFH(JRURYDQG6RQLQ¶VVHFRQGPDLQUHVXOW
LV WKDW WKHSULQFLSDO¶VFRPPLWment ability in terms of being able to threaten capital punishment 
for a revolutionary vizier determines optimal vizier competence.  This result is similar to the 
SUHGLFWLRQ RI :DJQHU¶V PRGHO WKDW WKH H[SHFWHG OHQJWK RI LQWHUDFWLRQV LQFUHDVHV RSWLPDO
compeWHQFH(JRURYDQG6RQLQ¶VWKHRU\GRHVQRWVSHDNWRWKHUROHRIVLGHRSSRUWXQLWLHV 
,Q *OD]HU¶V  PRGHO DQ RZQHU RI DQ RUJDQL]DWLRQ ZDQWV D ZRUNHU WR HQJDJH LQ
SURGXFLQJEHQHILWV IRUKLVILUP³H[WHUQDOUHQW-VHHNLQJ´ LQ*OD]HU¶V WHUPLQRORJ\EXW Ls worried 
that the worker instead focuses on internal rent-seeking.  Again the model is sufficiently general 
to apply to the present context.  Glazer finds that an employer will hire better staff the stiffer the 
competition for external rents.  The primary prediction that distinguishes his model from 
:DJQHU¶V LV WKDW LQ*OD]HU¶VDQDO\VLV WKH ODUJHUWKHDVVHWVVXEMHFWWRUHQW-seeking (i.e., the more 
important loyalty is for the owner), the smaller is the desired quality of staff.  On the other hand, 
the modeOLVDOVRGLIIHUHQWIURP(JRURYDQG6RQLQ¶VZRUOGEHFDXVHFRPPLWPHQWDELOLW\GRHVQRW
SOD\ D UROH *OD]HU¶V DSSURDFK WKXV KDV QR SUHGLFWLRQV IRU WKH HIIHFW RI WKH GLVFRXQW IDFWRU RQ
RSWLPDO FRPSHWHQFH  )LQDOO\ *OD]HU¶V PRGHO DOVR \LHOGV QR SUHGLFWLRQV IRr the role of side 
opportunities.12     
A final alternative (which is so simple that no one seems to have bothered with writing it 
down) would be a static multi-tasking model where more competent officials again have better 
side opportunities but where these can be part of a contract.  Only prediction (C) could follow 
from a contractible loyalty model.  Predictions (B) and (E) do not arise in this static framework.  
Without further complications, such a model also does not yield a relationship between the 
available side opportunities and competence (predictions (A) and (D)).  The labor market would 
price competence into the wage offered to an agent, making the participation constraint of the 
agent more binding.  The ultimate effect is that competence is irrelevant for the principal, after 
deducting the costs of employing a more competent agent.   
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In the light of these analytically plausible, but partially conflicting or complementary 
predictions, it is an empirical question as to which theory can best explain the available 
evidence.13   
3. Data and methodology 
Measuring the concepts that feature in the theoretical models is difficult, and any measurement is 
likely to be incomplete at best.  Still, a dataset compiled and thankfully made publicly available 
by Evans and Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Evans (2000) contains a rich set of variables that 
allow an econometric analysis of the above relationships.  Detailed information on the dataset is 
provided in the codebook (available for download at http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jrauch/webstate/) 
and in the original papers.  The Appendix to this paper contains the country list and a mapping of 
my variables to the Evans and Rauch data.   
Evans and Rauch constructed their data from questionnaires sent to country experts in 35 
semi-industrialized nations.  Experts were first asked to name the most important agencies in 
their country.14  The experts then answered questions concerning the hiring mechanisms, career 
perspectives, etc.  The experts did not disaggregate their answers according to the various 
DJHQFLHVEXWUDWKHUUHIHUUHGWR³WKHVHDJHQFLHV´LQDOOWKHLUDQVZHUV(DFKYDULDEOHLVFDWHJRULFDO
for individual expert answers, but Evans and Rauch average the answers of country experts so 
that the data are close to continuous for most variables.   
The rationale for using this sample is similar to that of Evans and Rauch (1990: 754).  An 
advantage of studying the countries at hand is that it is a relatively homogenous sample that 
allows studying variation in agency competence among semi-industrialized countries rather than 
between developing and advanced industrial countries.  Also, there is likely to be more variation 
in the relevant variables among semi-industrialized countries than among industrialized countries.  
Despite the appeal of using this dataset, however, the results should be interpreted as carefully as 
those of other cross-country studies with limited samples.   
 
Dependent variable 
Individual competence of high-level executives is not measured in the data.  However, experts 
provided information on what proportion of the higher officials in the agencies enter the civil 
service via a formal examination system.  The variable EXAMS contains this information.  Of 
course, it is not entirely obvious that the extent of the prevalence of formal civil service 
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H[DPLQDWLRQV LQFUHDVHV LQGLYLGXDOV¶FRPSHWHQFLHV %XW LW VHHPV OLNHO\ WKDW LW DW OHDVW VKLIWV WKH
distribution in the right direction.  As an alternative variable, I use UNIVERSITY which measures 
the education of those that do not enter through examinations.  Information on how selective 
exams are (e.g., the pass rate) is not included in the data.   
 
Key explanatory variables 
, PHDVXUH RIILFLDOV¶ WHPSWDWLRQV IRU GLVOR\DOW\ LQ WZR ZD\V  7KH ILUVW PHDVXUH IRU VLGH
opportunities is given by PRIVATESECTOR, which measures how common it is for higher 
officials in these agencies to spend substantial proportions of their careers in the private sector.  
The rationale for using this variable derives from the notion that in countries where private and 
public sector activities are significantly interspersed,  more competent officials are more able to 
leverage their skills in current side activities or in future outside activities, thus increasing 
RIILFLDOV¶SD\RIIVRQWKHUHQHJLQJSDWK,DOVo use PRIVATE-RETIRE in a robustness test.  This 
variable measures how common it is for higher officials to have significant post-retirement 
careers in the private sector. 
Second, agency officials can engage in illegal activities and collect bribes or other extra 
income.  The Evans and Rauch data contain information on how legal salaries compare to private 
sector salaries (RELATIVE SALARY) as well as how total income (legal plus illegal income) 
compares to the private sector (RELATIVE SALARY WITH BRIBES).  These comparisons are not 
given in monetary terms but in terms of ranks, but they are still informative.  The difference 
between these two variables, BRIBES, gives an (approximate) measure of the side opportunities.  
Note that BRIBES does not measure loyalty or disloyalty (as a behavior); rather, it measures the 
opportunity cost of loyalty.  More competent officials plausibly have more side opportunities, and 
these are opportunities the official can engage in while remaining employed at the agency.  Some 
of these illegal activities may be avoided by having explicit laws against them, and it is likely that 
the countries are doing what they can to limit corruption.  But imperfect law enforcement makes 
it plausible that at least some part of side opportunities remains that cannot be contracted away; 
indeed, BRIBES is almost always strictly positive in the sample.15 As a proxy for discounting, 
SHORTTIMEHORIZON measures the modal number of years spent by a typical higher level 
official in the agencies over his career.  This variable, which henceforth is abbreviated as SHORT, 
is equal to 1 when the time horizon is shorter than 10 years, and 0 when it is longer than 10 years.  
TIMEHORIZON is a variable that splits these two groups into two additional groups each, 
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resulting in four categories (1-5 years, 5-10 years, 10-20 years, 20 years or longer).  The results 
are robust to using this definition.   
Finally, measuring the value of loyalty is perhaps the most challenging task, and I recognize 
the limitations any proposed measure must bring with it.  In line with the theoretical discussion 
above, the value of loyalty to the government is at least co-determined by the costs of securing 
policy alignment.  This suggests that an appropriate measure of the value of loyalty is the power 
of agencies.  I use two variables: First, POWER measures how likely it is that ideas and policies 
LQLWLDWHGE\WKHDJHQFLHVSUHYDLO$FFRUGLQJWRWKHH[SHUWV¶RSLQLRQVQRDJHQF\LQWKHVDPSOHFDQ
prevail against the explicit will of the government; however, it costs the top executive political 
capital to force a decision. 
Second, I create an interaction term between POWER and a measure of how many policies 
the agency is in fact responsible for (POLICIES).  Intuitively, if an agency is responsible for 
many issues and can hold up the government when it withholds its approval, the loyalty of the 
agency executive and his staff is important.  This interaction term then constitutes my variable 
VALUE OF LOYALTY, which henceforth is abbreviated as LVALUE.  The main analysis is 
conducted with LVALUE, but all the results also hold if I use POWER instead.  
 
Control variables 
I also control for additional variables that do not play an explicit role in the theoretical model but 
can be hypothesized to affect the choice of recruiting systems in public agencies.  First, I employ 
a measure of the size of the pool of competence from which agency officials can be drawn.  For 
this, I use a proxy for human capital in the economy.  If we did not control for human capital, that 
would be an easy explanation for why an agency just cannot use civil service exams to select 
between potential officials.  I use the standard measure for educational attainment, the Barro and 
Lee (1993) measure of the average schooling years in the total population over age 25.  In the 
tables presented here, I use educational attainment from 1970, but the results are not 
substantively affected if I instead use the numbers from 1990.  It would be nice to control for the 
fungibility of human capital in agencies (for example, the proportion of lawyers).  Unfortunately, 
this information is not readily available for a sufficiently large sample of countries.   
Not all countries have the same history of using civil service exams.  While all countries 
except Argentina have had civil service examinations in place since the 1970s at the latest, there 
LVVRPHYDULDWLRQLQFRXQWULHV¶OHQJWKRIH[SHULHQFHZLWKWKLVJRYHUQDQFHWRRO7KXV,FRQWUROIRU
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D YDULDEOH IURP (YDQV DQG 5DXFK¶V H[SHUWV WKDW VXPPDUL]HV WKis history, HISTORYCIVIL.  I 
expect that countries with a longer history of using civil service exams generally are also more 
likely to use these exams for the higher positions in agencies.  
To further minimize the problem that the regressions may be picking up other country fixed 
HIIHFWV,DOVRLQFOXGHDPHDVXUHRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQWQDPHO\*'3SHUFDSLWDIURPWKH
Penn World Tables.  The regressions in the paper use the level from 1970, but the results hold if I 
instead use data from 1990 as well.  
Moreover, I control for how many of the top levels in the agencies are in fact political 
appointees (POLAPP).  It is likely that a country with more political appointees is more resistant 
to an exams-based system.   
 
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are contained in Table 1 (at the end of the paper).   
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
$ IHZ REVHUYDWLRQV DUH LQ RUGHU  )LUVW DOO RI WKH DJHQFLHV WKDW (YDQV¶ DQG 5DXFK¶V H[SHUWV
provided data for are important in the sense that none of them just implements policy dictated 
from above.  Second, without exception, in all agencies, there is at least some degree of political 
appointment of executives and high officials; often, this goes even into the second and third 
levels of the hierarchy.16 
 
Estimation strategy and limitations 
The generic regression I run is the following: 
i
* * *( * )
                      * *( * )
                     g*
i i i i i
i i i
EXAMS a b LVALUE c SHORT d LVALUE SHORT
e OUTSIDEOPTIONS f OUTSIDEOPTIONS SHORT
CONTROLS
   
 

 
where OUTSIDEOPTIONS are either PRIVATESECTOR or BRIBES and where CONTROLS 
comprise available human capital in the economy, level of development, the history of civil 
service exams, and the extent of political appointment.  Being the average of opinions, EXAMS 
has many categories, and so I employ OLS estimation with heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors.   ,QWKHDERYHUHJUHVVLRQ:DJQHU¶V06) model leads us to expect b>0, c<0, d<0, e<0, 
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I!(JRURYDQG6RQLQ¶VPRGHOLPSOLHVEF*OD]HU¶VPRGHOLPSOLHVEDQG
the contractible loyalty model implies b>0.   
I highlight for the reader a limitation of this empirical approach.  Because of the cross-
sectional nature of the data, addressing endogeneity is very difficult.  If we had time-series data, 
we could employ a fixed effects estimator to address the potential concern of an omitted variable 
bias, but such data are not available.  Of course, the cleanest approach to clarifying causality 
would be an instrumental variables estimation.  This would require the availability of a valid 
instrument, i.e., an exogenous variable that affects, for example, the value of loyalty, but has no 
effect on competence in agencies through other channels except for its effect on the value of 
loyalty.  But such a variable is very hard to find.17  While this limitation is not to be taken lightly, 
one might first note that the first generation of the empirical literature on economic growth 
proceeded along these lines even though the authors at the time were, of course, also aware of the 
limitations of their approach.  Second, and less defensively, the importance of the question of 
what factors are associated with competence in public agencies compels the researcher to use 
data to make the best inferences possible with them.  At the very least, therefore, the paper 
provides novel evidence on the correlations between relevant factors of the institutional setup of 
economies, even if one wishes to abstain from making statements about causality.  Third, the fact 
that some of the explanatory variables of interest are interaction terms makes it far less plausible 
that the estimates for these variables are confounded by endogeneity.   
4. Findings 
Since the non-contractible loyalty model provides the most stringent set of hypotheses testable 
ZLWKWKHGDWDWKLVVHFWLRQRUJDQL]HVWKHHYLGHQFHDURXQGWKLVPRGHO¶VSUHGLFWLRQV 
I begin by considering partial correlations of the variables of interest.  These can be found 
in Table 2, where the most relevant correlations highlighted in bold face.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
As predicted, the value of loyalty and the time horizon are positively correlated with 
competence, while outside opportunities (as measured by private sector contacts and extra 
income through bribes) are negatively correlated with competence.  Notably, though, for short 
time horizons, the correlation of the value of loyalty and competence is virtually zero, while it is 
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strongly positive for long time horizons; moreover, the effect of bribes is more pronounced when 
interactions are long.  I next test the predictions concerning the joint effects of importance of 
loyalty, outside opportunities, and the time horizon in a regression framework.   
Consider Table 3.  While the first column shows that the value of loyalty is not 
significantly related to competence on its own, the effect becomes positive and significant, 
consistent with hypothesis (C), once we control for other variables as we move to the right in the 
table, suggesting that the omission of those variables had biased downwards the coefficient for 
LVALUE in the first column.   
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Column (2) indicates that, consistent with hypothesis (B), relatively short-term interactions are 
associated with lower competence levels.  Moreover, according to columns (3) and (4), the 
interaction effect between the value of loyalty and impatience has a negative sign, which is 
consistent with hypothesis (E).  Thus, overall, for a short time horizon, the value of loyalty is 
negatively associated with the level of competence.  The theory predicts that where interactions 
are too short to establish loyalty with competent agencies, governments need to sacrifice 
competence in order to secure adequate levels of loyalty, and this prediction is borne out in the 
data.  The short time horizon dummy itself has a positive sign in these two regressions, but when 
taking into account the interaction with the value of loyalty, the overall marginal effect, evaluated 
at the mean, is negative, as predicted, and is statistically significant.   
As for the control variables, as expected, richer countries and those who have had civil 
service exams in place for a longer period of time choose more stringent access rules to the 
higher echelons of government.  Finally, column (4) shows that, as expected, political 
appointment and (more or less objective) civil service exams are incompatible.  The coefficients 
on the value of loyalty and the interaction between the value and impatience retain the predicted 
sign also with this control.  This forms the preferred specification for further analysis.   
This evidence already helps us to distinguish some theories.  Glazer (2002) and Egorov and 
Sonin (2006) predict a negative relationship between LVALUE and EXAMS, while the data show 
a positive relationship, more consistent with Wagner (2006).  Both Egorov and Sonin (2006) and 
Wagner (2006) predict a negative relationship between SHORT and EXAMS, as is observed in the 
data, while Glazer (2002) does not.   
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The findings so far could also be evidence for an alternative story, namely, that the 
JRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHDJHQFLHV¶RIILFLDOVFDQFRQWUDFWRQ OR\DOW\DQGWKDW OR\DOW\DQGFRPSHWHQFH
are complements in productLRQLHWKDWWKHYDOXHRIOR\DOW\LVSRVLWLYHO\UHODWHGWRDQDJHQFLHV¶
competence.  Thus, we would also see a positive correlation between LVALUE and EXAMS.  In 
RWKHUZRUGVDQXQREVHUYHGYDULDEOHVXFKDVWKH³SURGXFWLRQWHFKQRORJ\´RIWKHFRXQWU\FRXOd be 
driving the correlation, or there may be reverse causality.  One answer to this challenge is that 
even observing the correlation in the data is informative.   
However, we can also make additional statements that cast some doubt on the alternative 
interpretations.  First, on theoretical grounds it is hard to see how loyalty of the sort relevant here 
can be contracted upon in a court-enforceable way.  Second, the results also hold when the 
measure of the value of loyalty is POWER instead of LVALUE, and POWER would also seem to 
be affected only to a small extent by the competence of the agency officials.  Third, the 
interaction term between LVALUE and SHORT is unlikely to be affected by endogeneity, but it is 
significant and goes in the direction predicted by the theory.  Of course, as mentioned earlier, we 
would ideally approach the issue with an instrumental variables approach.  Unfortunately, it is 
very hard to come up with a valid instrument.  Legal origins (see La Porta et al. (1997; 1998)), 
for example, work well from a statistical point of view ± they are highly significant in the first 
stage, and the significance of LVALUE is retained in the second-stage regression.  However, on 
economic grounds it is simply not plausible that legal origins affect agency competence only 
through the importance of agency loyalty.   
There is yet another way in which to make progress.  In particular, the theory fortunately 
has additional predictions which relate to the role of side opportunities and which do not follow 
from a multi-tasking model or a model where competence is just a factor in producing loyalty as 
the output.  These joint predictions are tested in Table 4.  Testing multiple predictions at the same 
time is, even in the presence of potential endogeneity of some of the variables, a much more 
difficult hurdle to clear for any theory.   
Column (5) in Table 4 shows that the availability of outside options, as measured by private 
VHFWRUFRQWDFWVVLJQLILFDQWO\UHGXFHVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VRSWLPDOFRPSHWHQFHOHYHOK\SRthesis (A).  
This result also holds when using instead the possibility of a career in the private sector after 
retirement (not shown).  Note that the value of loyalty retains the positive sign in all regressions.   
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
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Another measure of the availability of side opportunities is the income differential between 
salary and salary including bribes and the difference between public and private sector salaries.  
Unreported results available on request indicate that high legal pay in the public sector relative to 
the private sector tends to be associated with more competent agency officials, but that where 
salary including bribes is high, less competent officials are observed.  In some specifications 
there is also a negative effect of available illegal income on optimal competence.  In the main 
specification reported here, this direct effect is not significant, as shown in column (6).  
Interestingly, though, column (7) shows that the prediction (D) concerning the interaction 
between side opportunities and the time horizon is borne out in the data, and, in fact, very 
strongly so.  These results are important because a simple negative correlation between the 
availability of extra income in the public sector and competence would also arise in a model 
where agency officials are paid their marginal product in both the private and public sectors but 
can receive fixed amounts of bribes in the public sector.  That model would, however, not predict 
the interaction effects between side opportunities and the time horizon.   
 
Robustness 
The results also hold for an alternative dependent variable.  In particular, they hold with the 
proportion of those who do not enter via examinations but have university or post-graduate 
degrees.   
Omitting the variable measuring the history of the existence of civil service exams does not 
materially change the results.  (The results for side opportunities become more significant, while 
the results for the value of loyalty become less significant.)   
As mentioned earlier, the findings also hold controlling for GDP per capita in 1990 or 
human capital in 1990.  Given that the regressions control for several important country variables, 
the effects found over and above this effect can most likely be attributed to the tradeoff between 
loyalty and competence, especially because the theory is fairly specific in its predictions.   
The results also hold for an alternative proxy for the duration of the interaction, namely, the 
extent of political dependence.  This variable measures whether incumbents of top positions are 
likely to be moved to positions of lesser importance when leadership changes.  This measure is 
only informative for countries where there is a sufficient turnover in chief executives.  
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Controlling for legal origin also does not change the results and is also not a significant 
explanatory variable in itself.  Including measures of corruption (from various sources: 
Transparency International, La Porta et al. 1997, and Kaufmann et al. 2009) as a control variable 
does not affect the results.  (It cannot be used in the regression which includes the level of bribes 
because these two variables are highly correlated.  Corruption as a proxy for outside opportunities 
also fares well in the regressions, with the predicted results.)   
Unfortunately, insufficient data are available to analyze competence across agencies in the 
same country.  This would be a fruitful area for future research.  In the present analysis, putting in 
dummies that capture which agency was regarded as the most important in various countries does 
not substantially affect the results.   
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has tested various theories of competence in public agencies, with a particular 
emphasis on a notion recently analyzed by Glazer (2002), Egorov and Sonin (2006) and Wagner 
(2006), namely, that under some circumstances there is a tradeoff between loyalty and 
competence.  Using data from public agencies in a cross-section of countries, the paper finds the 
following evidence: Higher competence of agency officials is observed (1) when agency loyalty 
is arguably more important to the government, (2) when the time horizon for the interactions 
between the government and agency officials is longer, and (3) when outside options for agency 
officials are worse.  Moreover, competence is lower (4) when loyalty is important but 
simultaneously the time horizon is short, and (5) when outside opportunities improve but 
simultaneously the time horizon is long.  While not all of these results hold significantly in all 
regressions, overall, this evidence is most consistent, or at least not inconsistent, with a model of 
non-contractible loyalty.  Alternative models either have differing predictions that are rejected in 
the data or can explain only subsets of these predictions.  Notably, although the statistical 
analysis for each individual regression is not completely free from concerns regarding 
endogeneity, the joint evidence across several explanatory variables appears less likely to be 
affected by this problem.  Nonetheless, other tests and applications can and should be considered.  
For example, it would be interesting to analyze intra-agency hiring policies, but for this, richer 
data from within agencies is needed.  Also, time-varying data would greatly help.  For example, 
countries which value meritocracy may also value high loyalty, and a panel setup could aid in 
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filtering out unobserved variables and in (statistically) identifying the effects discussed in this 
paper.  Thus, while the results in this paper are suggestive, further research can certainly improve 
our understanding not only of appropriate ways of modeling loyalty and competence but also of 
how countries do (and should) allocate competence within the public sector.   
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6. Appendix 
6.1 Countries 
$UJHQWLQD%UD]LO&KLOH&RORPELD&RVWD5LFD&RWHG¶,YRLUH'RPLQLFDQ5HSXEOLF(FXDGRU 
Egypt, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Kenya, (South) Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Zaire. 
 
6.2 Data on agencies 
This data comes from Evans and Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Evans (2000).  Respondents to 
WKHVHDXWKRUV¶VXUYH\ZHUHWROG³We are interested primarily in what these bureaucracies looked 
like in the recent past, roughly 1970-1990.  In answering the following questions, assume that 
³KLJKHURIILFLDOV´UHIHUV WR WKRVHZKRKROG URXJKO\ WKH WRSSRVLWLRQV LQ WKHFRUHHFRQRPLF
agencies [we discussed above].´ 
 
EXAMS Approximately what proportion of the higher officials in these 
agencies enter the civil service via a formal examination system? 
1=  less than 30%, 2 = 30-60%, 3 = 60-90%, 4 = more than 90% 
UNIVERSITY Of those that do not enter via examinations, what proportion have 
university or post-graduate degrees? 
1=  less than 30%, 2 = 30-60%, 3 = 60-90%, 4 = more than 90% 
POWER How likely are ideas and policies initiated by these agencies to 
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prevail? 
1 =  no more likely than ideas coming out of other parts of the 
state bureaucracy 
2 =  quite likely, even in the face of opposition from other parts of 
the bureaucracy, as long as the chief executive is neutral or 
supportive 
3 =  under the circumstances above and also sometimes even in 
the face of opposition from the chief executive 
POLICIES Which of the following descriptions best fits the role of these 
agencies? 
1=  they rarely originate new policies, but are important in 
turning policies that originate in the political arena into 
programs that can be implemented 
2 =  some new policies originate inside them and they are 
LPSRUWDQW³ILOWHUV³IRUSROLF\LGHDVWKDWFome from political 
parties, private elites and the chief executive, often reshaping 
these ideas in the process 
3 =  many new economic policies originate inside them 
LVALUE (VALUE OF 
LOYALTY) 
POWER * POLICIES (This variable is calculated for the present 
study) 
SHORT 
(SHORTTIMEHORIZON) 
What is roughly the modal number of years spent by a typical high 
level official in one of these agencies during his career? 
1=  1-10 years, 0 = 10 years to entire career 
TIMEHORIZON What is roughly the modal number of years spent by a typical 
high level official in one of these agencies during his career? 
1=  1-5 years, 2 = 5-10 years, 3 =  10-20 years, 4 = entire career 
POLAPP Roughly how many of the top levels in these agencies are political 
appointees (e.g., appointed by the President or Chief Executive) 
1=  none, 2= just agency chiefs, 3=agency chiefs and vice chiefs, 
4=  all of top 2 or 3 levels  
PRIVATESECTOR How common is it for higher officials in these agencies to spend 
substantial proportions of their careers in the private sector, 
interspersing private and public sector activity? 
1=  normal, 2=frequent but not modal, 3= unusual, 4 = almost 
never 
PRIVATE-RETIRE How common is it for higher officials in these agencies to have 
significant post-retirement careers in the private sector? 
1=  normal, 2=frequent but not modal, 3= unusual, 4 = almost 
never 
RELATIVE SALARY How would you estimate the salaries (and perquisites, not 
including bribes or other extra-legal sources of income) of higher 
officials in these agencies relative to those of private sector 
managers with roughly comparable training and responsibilities?  
1=  less than 50%, 2=  50-80%, 3 =  80-90%, 4 =  comparable, 5 = 
higher 
RELATIVE SALARY 
WITH BRIBES 
(Follow-up to RELATIVE SALARY): If bribes and other extra-
legal perquisites are included what would the proportion be? 
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1=  less than 50%, 2=  50-80%, 3 =  80-90%, 4 =  comparable, 5 = 
higher 
BRIBES Difference between RELATIVE SALARY WITH BRIBES and 
RELATIVE SALARY.  (This variable is calculated for the present 
study.)  
HISTORYCIVIL (Note: This question refers to the higher Civil Service more 
broadly, not just to the top 500 officials in the 
core agencies.) Since roughly what date have civil service 
examinations been in place? (reordered from the original survey) 
1 =  1990 -, 2 =  1980-1989, 3 =  1970-1979, 4 = 1950-1969, 5 = 
1900-1949, 6 = Pre-1900  
POLDEP Are the incumbents of these top positions likely to be moved to 
positions of lesser importance when political leadership changes? 
1= almost always, 2= usually, 3= sometimes, 4= rarely 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 The transcript is at http://transcripts.cnn.com/transcripts/0411/19/pzn.01.html. 
2
 Other work has explored the empirical content of general theories of loyalty.  For example, Verwimp (2003) uses 
the model of Wintrobe (1998) to help in understanding the regime in Rwanda that first aimed to buy political loyalty 
and then turned to repression.  
3
 Using civil service exams as a recruitment tool can, of course, impose significant rent-seeking costs on society.  
Test-takers will allocate their time and effort away from productive acitivities in order to master the material on 
which they will be examined, and educational institutions will teach to the test if they are evaluated on the basis of 
how many of their graduates pass civil service or other exams.   
4
 Other seminal work has considered the economics within agencies.  Tullock (1965) formulated a model of the 
relations between individuals within a bureaucracy, focusing on the advancement and promotion procedures within 
bureaus.  Downs (1967) also considered the management process within agencies, and he also presented an 
evolutionary or longitudinal premise by tracLQJ WKH SROLWLFDO ³OLIH´ RI D EXUHDX RYHU WLPH LH a life-cycle.  An 
H[WUHPHYHUVLRQRI WKHSRZHURI WKHEXUHDXFUDF\ LVUHIOHFWHG LQ%UHQQDQDQG%XFKDQDQ¶V /HYLDWKDQPRGHO
where the bureaucracy and the legislature are one monolithic agent who exploits his power over the citizenry.   
5
 The inefficiency is reduced when the sponsor can partially monitor or penalize the bureau and the bureaucrat is 
risk-averse (Bendor, et al. 1985) or when the sponsor can conceal its demand from the bureau (Miller and Moe 1983).  
See also Makris (2006) for a recent analysis that suggests that the outcome may be more efficient than usually 
assumed. 
6
 This analysis takes as given the notion that the government decentralizes at least some decisions. See Seabright 
(1996), Laffont and Martimort (1998), Laffont and Zantman (2002) for discussions on this point.  See Borge et al. 
(2008) for an analysis of the relationship between party fragmentation and efficiency of institutions.    
7
 The models presented later also apply within agencies and bureaus and, as such, also relate to the work by Tullock 
(1965) and Downs (1967).  However, data to test the models within organizations are not usually available.  See 
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%UHWRQ  IRU D FROOHFWLRQ RI RWKHU DJHQF\ PRGHOV KHOSIXO LQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ ³DJHQF\ ZLWKLQ DJHQFLHV´  $Q
especially complex question, neglected here, is ensuring appropriate behavior in hierarchies, i.e., settings with three 
or more layers.  See Tirole (1986), Tirole (1992), Vafaï (2002) and Vafaï (2005).   
8
 EYHQDJRYHUQPHQW WKDW VWHDOVDOOWKHDJHQFLHV¶SURGXFWLRQ LV LQterested in their competence.  In all but the most 
autocratic societies, there is also at least some degree of accountability of government, and to the extent that 
ultimately the government has to fear revolution or being thrown out of office democratically if it does not provide 
the services its citizens desire, it will maintain a sufficiently high level of agency competence. 
9
 As shown in Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), corruption is very hard to eradicate solely by raising wages.   
10
 This assumes away intrinsic motivations of bureaucrats and other aspects of motives in bureaucracies.  See Wise 
(2004) for a comprehensive review of work on these issues.  In addition, the analysis assumes away monitoring and 
auditing as key tools of governance within organizations and between.  See Baron and Besanko (1984), Kofman and 
Lawarrée (1993) and Dittman (1999) for formal models of auditing.  
11
 Other channels through which the time horizon matters have also been developed.  For example, see Konrad and 
Torsvik (1997) for a model of term limits when information revelation is the economic problem.   
12
 *OD]HU¶VPRGHOGRHVKDYHLQWHUHVWLQJWHVWDEOHSUHGLFWLRQVIRUWKHHIIHFWRIWKHRZQHU¶VFRPSHWHQFHRQWKHZRUNHU¶V
competence, but to test these would require information about the ability of the government, which is not available. 
13
 This is not a complete list of economic theories that speak to the tradeoff between loyalty and competence.  
Prendergast and Topel (1996) show that a principal who values the power to affect his ageQW¶VZHOIDUHPD\SUHIHU
less competent agents, and Friebel and Raith (2004) posit that a manager may fear competent subordinates because 
they may wish to take his post.  These models can explain an inverse relationship between loyalty and competence 
but have no other predictions that can be tested with the present data.  The reason is that the Friebel and Raith model 
assumes that the middle manager chooses different hiring standards for his subordinates than top management uses 
for the middle manager.  By contrast, in the present dataset, we have information only about the overall use of 
entrance exams for the most important positions in agencies.  The Prendergast and Topel model is also more about 
the misallocation of talent within organizations rather than about the overall level of talent.   
14
 In total, 126 experts participated in the study.  The number of expert survey respondents per country varies and is 
reported in Rauch and Evans (2000: 69).  See the Appendix for the instructions given to the experts.  Ranked by their 
average importance (between 1 and 4) as determined by the experts, the agencies are: Ministry of Finance, 3.11, 
Planning Ministry, 1.94, President's or Prime Minister's Office / Royal Palace, 1.60, Central Bank, 1.57, Trade 
Ministry, 1.49, Other, 1.09, Ministry of Economics, 0.71, Monetary Authority, 0.23, Defense Ministry, 0.20.   
15
 One theoretical concern might be the following: If one aspect of loyalty is the absence of bribes, and we still 
observe a positive level of bribes in the data, does that not imply that agents do not act loyally? After all, all the 
PRGHOV¶SUHGLFWLRQVDERYHDUHHTXLOLEULXPSUHGLFWLRQVWKDWDSSO\ZKHQWKHSULQFLSDOREWDLQVDWOHDVWSDUWLDOOR\DOW\
There are several responses to this issue.  First, loyalty has multiple dimensions, only one of which is the absence of 
bribes.  Second, the very presence of bribes suggests that it is difficult to get rid of them with laws (which are in 
place in virtually all of the countries analyzed).  Where the temptation for accepting bribes is higher, they will be 
accepted, thus inducing the need for lower competence in order to somewhat limit, but not extinguish, bribery.  Of 
course, if the governing regime itself is corrupt, then corruption on the part of agencies may be an act of loyalty.   
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16
 These two facts can be seen from noting that the minimum values RI WKH YDULDEOHV ³1XPEHU RI SROLFLHV´ DQG
³([WHQWRISROLWLFDODSSRLQWPHQW´DUHQRW 
17
 I report results with legal origin as a potential instrumental variable in the text below, but on theoretical grounds, 
this seems a problematic instrument, even if the empirical effects in the second stage regression come out nicely.  
After all, it is quite possible that legal origin is related directly to different types of recruitment in different countries.   
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
EXAMS: Formal exams for high officials 35 2.17 1.00 1.00 4.00 
POLICIES: Number of policies originating in agencies 35 2.27 0.43 1.50 3.00 
POWER: Power of agencies 35 1.95 0.26 1.33 2.40 
LVALUE: Value of loyalty 35 4.46 1.20 2.44 6.24 
SHORT: Short time horizon 35 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Value of loyalty * Short time horizon 35 1.95 2.46 0.00 6.24 
HISTORYCIVIL: History of civil service 35 4.19 0.98 1.00 6.00 
POLAPP: Extent of political appointment 35 3.11 0.59 1.50 4.00 
PRIVATESECTOR: Private sector contacts 35 2.46 0.89 1.00 4.00 
BRIBES: Extra income from bribes etc. 35 1.06 0.97 -0.50 2.83 
Extra income from bribes * short time horizon 35 0.46 0.89 -0.50 2.67 
GDP per capita 1970 35 2422.49 1502.31 586.00 6004.00 
Human capital 1970 35 3.36 1.74 0.90 7.62 
 
Note: Variables in CAPITAL letters are from Evans and Rauch (1999) and Rauch and Evans 
(2000).  The other variables are created as described in the Appendix.  GDP p.c. is from the 
Penn World Tables, and human capital is from Barro and Lee (1993).  
 
 
Table 2: Correlations between the dependent variable and key explanatory variables 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
EXAMS: Formal exams 1.000     
LVALUE: Value of loyalty 0.160 1.000    
SHORT: Short time horizon -0.309 0.070 1.000   
PRIVATESECTOR: Private sector contacts -0.521 -0.111 0.471 1.000  
BRIBES: Extra income through bribes -0.414 -0.397 -0.023 0.057 1.000 
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Table 3: Competence in public agencies, the importance of loyalty, and the time 
horizon 
Dependent variable: EXAMS: Extent of formal examinations for high positions in 
civil service 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LVALUE: Value of loyalty (#policies * power) -0.012 0.382 0.338 
  (0.09) (2.86)*** (3.66)*** 
SHORT: Short time horizon -0.618 2.190 2.122 
  (2.02)* (1.66) (2.15)** 
Value of loyalty * short time horizon -0.609 -0.572 
  (2.40)** (2.95)*** 
POLAPP: Extent of political appointment  -0.498 
of high officials (1.96)* 
HISTORYCIVIL History of civil service exams 0.666 0.614 0.633 0.590 
  (5.34)** (4.32)*** (3.99)*** (3.89)*** 
GDP p.c. 1970 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (1.96) (1.81)* (2.42)** (3.13)*** 
Human capital 1970 0.063 0.071 0.031 -0.005 
  (0.68) (0.65) (0.30) (0.06) 
Constant 3.501 3.635 1.868 3.478 
  (4.03)** (6.75)*** (2.19)** (3.03)*** 
Observations 35 35 35 35 
R-squared 0.43 0.52 0.63 0.70 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent 
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Table 4: Competence in public agencies and predictions regarding 
the availability of outside options 
Dependent variable: EXAMS: Extent of formal examinations for high 
positions in civil service 
  (5) (6) (7) 
PRIVATESECTOR: Outside options -0.395 
(2.01)* 
BRIBES: Extra income from bribes etc. -0.031 -0.338 
  (0.16) (1.78)* 
Extra income from bribes * short time horizon 0.386 
  (2.05)** 
LVALUE: Value of loyalty (#policies * power) 0.344 0.330 0.249 
  (2.95)*** (3.27)*** (2.34)** 
SHORT: Short time horizon 2.375 2.103 1.268 
  (2.44)** (2.22)** (0.91) 
Value of loyalty * short time horizon -0.574 -0.567 -0.447 
  (2.89)*** (3.12)*** (1.82)* 
POLAPP: Extent of political  -0.311 -0.495 -0.498 
appointment of high officials  (1.28) (1.95)* (1.82)* 
HISTORYCIVIL: History of civil service exams 0.499 0.582 0.590 
  (4.04)*** (3.00)*** (3.04)*** 
GDP p.c. 1970 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (2.57)** (2.51)** (2.46)** 
Human capital 1970 0.023 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.26) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 3.401 3.525 4.228 
  (3.30)*** (3.11)*** (2.79)** 
Observations 35 35 35 
R-squared 0.78 0.70 0.72 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent 
 
 
 
 
